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Social Transformation, Dispute over Routes and the Split of the Malaysian Islamic Party

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Abstract: In Malaysia’s Fourteenth General Election, the National Trust Party (AMANAH) won 11 seats in the House of Representatives, growing into an influential Islamic party within the country. The expansion of the Malay ethnic middle class and the imbalance of regional development together brought about the decline of the Ulama faction and the differentiation of the professional group within the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS); this triggered a dispute over routes concerning “how to realize an Islamic state,” and ultimately led to the split of PAS and the founding of the National Trust Party. As a newborn political party, AMANAH must achieve a differentiated positioning relative to other Malay-based political parties and establish a unified ideological foundation, so as to survive in the political arena over the long term.

Keywords: Malaysia; Islamic Party; National Trust Party; social transformation; party split

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Introduction

On 9 May 2018, Malaysia held its Fourteenth General Election and, for the first time since independence, achieved a change in the governing party. The National Trust Party (Parti Amanah Negara, hereafter “AMANAH”), newly established in 2015, won 11 seats in the House of Representatives and 34 seats in the State Legislative Assemblies in this general election,[1] becoming, after the Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se Malaysia, hereafter “PAS”), the second-largest Islamic political party on the Malaysian political stage.

Islam has always been an important factor in Malaysian politics. For many years, PAS and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) waged a prolonged struggle to contend for the discursive authority on Islamic questions. The founding of AMANAH changed the configuration of Islamic party politics in Malaysia. The party is committed to becoming Malaysia’s premier Islamic party (*parti Islam utama*)[2] and to building a just, trustworthy, and welfare-filled nation for all the people. The earliest cohort of AMANAH’s members all came from PAS. In 2015, PAS and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) developed differences over the issue of Islamic criminal law, leading to the dissolution of the “Pakatan Rakyat” (People’s Alliance) and ultimately triggering an internal split within PAS. This was the second time the phenomenon of a party split centered on political Islam had appeared in Malaysia since 1983, when former PAS chairman Mohamad Asri left PAS and founded the Hizbul Muslimin Party of Malaysia (Parti Hizbul Muslimin Malaysia, HAMIM, hereafter “HAMIM”).^① Why would a traditional party — founded nearly 70 years ago, long active on the Malaysian political stage in the role of an opposition party, and having at its peak captured the governments of three states in Malaysia’s successive general elections — be willing to sacrifice a strong party alliance, and even provoke intraparty struggle, thereby ultimately bringing about its own internal split?

The academic communities at home and abroad have produced considerable research on PAS. Xu Liping,^② Fan Ruolan,^③ He Shengda,^④ Chen Zhonghe,^⑤ and Farish A. Noor^⑥ have all explored the historical evolution and the development of thought within PAS — particularly its transformation after the Islamic revival of the 1970s. Because they were published relatively early, none of these works offers an explanation for the research question of this article. Nevertheless, Farish A. Noor, in two of his works, clearly displays the intricate conflicts of interest and factional struggles within PAS; Chen Zhonghe, too, advanced a highly prescient conclusion in his book: the greatest challenge and difficulty that PAS’s development faces is “not its ideas themselves, but its mode of practice.” This judgment is of great heuristic value for analyzing PAS’s split.

Dominik M. Müller^⑦ focuses on the changes in the currents of thought within the PAS Youth wing since 2010, arguing that PAS and Islamic law still have a broad popular base among young Malaysians. His account of the internal struggles within PAS in his book *Islam, Politics and Youth in Malaysia* is of some

help in constructing the model of this article. Wan Saiful Wan Jan,^⑧ a former research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore, introduces the basic situation of AMANAH and holds that the state of Johor provided the soil for AMANAH's establishment. The above conclusion is clearly inconsistent with the results of the Fourteenth General Election in 2018; the author, Wan Saiful, analyzes AMANAH solely through the political situation in Johor, and this has its shortcomings, because AMANAH's principal supporters are located in Selangor rather than Johor.

Maszlee Malik, an assistant professor at the International Islamic University Malaysia, has conducted a relatively in-depth study of AMANAH's establishment.^⑨ He proposes that during the "Arab Spring," the political thought of the Tunisian leader Rached Ghannouchi exerted a certain influence on Malaysia: power-sharing among various interest groups can be realized, and democracy is another interpretation of the spirit of the Islamic concept of *shura*, or "consultation," within the Western discursive system.^⑩ At the same time, he holds that AMANAH's thought has affinities with the "Muslim Democrats"^⑪ proposed by Ghannouchi of Tunisia. However, Maszlee's research magnifies external factors, because Malaysia lies on the periphery of the Islamic world; its basic national condition as a multi-ethnic country and its relatively moderate political atmosphere determine that Islamic currents of thought and radical democratizing transformations can exert only limited influence, and domestic Malaysian factors remain the fundamental point of departure for studying AMANAH's establishment.

This article intends first to sort through the history of PAS's split and AMANAH's founding, then to attempt to explain the motives behind the split within PAS, and finally to make a prediction about AMANAH's future direction of development. This article argues that the expansion of the Malay urban middle class and the imbalance of regional development are the fundamental causes of PAS's split, while sudden changes at the leadership level and the development of Islamic currents of thought worldwide are important intervening variables. At the same time, the newly established AMANAH still faces many challenges; how to achieve a differentiated positioning relative to other Malay-based political parties is a political reality that AMANAH will inevitably have to confront.

I. From the "Professional Group" to AMANAH

Malaysia's PAS was founded in 1951, originally named the Pan-Malayan Islamic Association (Persatuan Islam Sa-Malaya), and was renamed the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Partai Islam Sa-Malaysia)^⑫ in 1971.[3] In its early period, PAS was concerned more with the dominant position of the Malays (Ketuanan Melayu) than with religious questions. They hoped to use religion to "assimilate" all citizens of Malaya into "Malays" and to eliminate the so-called "Malay privileges." [4] It was not until the late 1970s, when the Ulama faction within PAS rose, that the direction of PAS's development was changed.

(1) Establishment of the Ulama Faction's Leadership

In the 1970s, accompanying the rise of Islamic forces worldwide, the demand to revive Islam within Malaysia grew increasingly strong. Malay university students used Islam to vent their dissatisfaction with reality, and the burgeoning student movement became the principal force driving the Islamic revival.[5]

Before the 1978 general election, PAS absorbed a group of leaders from the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM) into the party, key figures among whom included Hadi

Awang and Fadzil Noor. These young Turks quickly turned the tables and formed another leadership center within the party, actively seeking the recognition and support of the party's other elders — especially the Ulama group represented by Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat (hereafter “Nik Aziz”), who had been excluded from the center of power.[6]

In 1979, the Islamic Revolution broke out in Iran. The young Turks within the party were deeply inspired, firmly convinced that only the Ulama could truly rule the nation, and on this basis they began to attack the then chairman of PAS, Mohamad Asri; they believed that, compared with Iran, Asri's positions were still too secular and materialistic.[7]

During the same period, the former Malaysian ambassador to Iran, Yusuf Rawa, returned home; deeply inspired, he hoped to replicate the success of the Islamic Revolution in Malaysia. As it happened, Asri had lost support within the party, and Yusuf swiftly replaced Asri's position of leadership.[8] To be sure, PAS performed poorly in the 1986 general election; but this did not halt the pace of PAS's reform. In 1987, Yusuf reformed PAS's organizational structure, hoping to build PAS into a party ruled by the Ulama. Yusuf added a new Ulama Consultative Council (Majlis Syura Ulama)^① and created the position of Spiritual Leader (Murshid'ul Am).^② As a result, the Ulama faction took control of all important positions within the party and established its leadership position within the party.[9] In 1989, Yusuf resigned from his party posts owing to poor health, and Fadzil Noor took over as party chairman.

(2) The “Reformasi” Movement^③ and the Formation of the “Professional Group”

In September 1998, the then deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, was dismissed without warning and was arrested and imprisoned. This “political dark curtain” ignited the long-accumulated contradictions within the largest Malay ethnic party, UMNO, and indeed among the Malays themselves, and directly led to the outbreak of the “Reformasi” movement. Seizing this opportunity, PAS for the first time allied with the Justice Party (keADILan)^④ and the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party, forming the “Barisan Alternatif” (Alternative Front) to oppose the UMNO-led “Barisan Nasional” (National Front).

The Reformasi movement was the starting point for the formation of the “professional group” (professional group) within PAS. Fadzil Noor was relatively pragmatic in his religious positions. In order to win the trust of the Democratic Action Party and form an alliance, Fadzil Noor chose to shelve the political agenda of an “Islamic state” and dispatched many well-educated secular professionals — such as lawyers, doctors, and university teachers — to contest the general election.[10] In the subsequent general election, PAS won 27 seats in the House of Representatives, becoming at a stroke Malaysia's largest opposition party, and also seized the government of the state of Terengganu.[11]

Fadzil Noor died in 2002, and the series of intraparty reforms that he had presided over and promoted were thereby interrupted. Hadi Awang, an idealist on religious matters, assumed the post of party chairman, after which PAS attempted to implement Islamic criminal law in Terengganu. However, the Democratic Action Party refused to compromise with PAS on religious questions and ultimately withdrew from the Alternative Front. In the 2004 general election, PAS won only 7 seats in the House of Representatives and, moreover, lost the government of Terengganu.[12]

The stark contrast between the results of the two general elections of 1999 and 2004 sparked a debate within PAS over the line of struggle, and party chairman Hadi Awang chose to devolve power to the party's political

up-and-comers. In the 2005 party election, the newly elected central committee members Nasarudin Mat Isa, Kamarudin Jaffar,^⑤ and Dzulkefly Ahmad^⑥ were all political up-and-comers cultivated by Fadzil Noor during the Reformasi period. The non-Ulama faction, long marginalized within the party, also seized this opportunity to seek entry into the leadership; among them, Husam Musa and Mohamad Sabu were elected vice-chairmen, while Salahuddin Ayub^⑦ was re-elected as head of the PAS Youth wing.[13]

The distinction between the “professional group” and the Ulama faction is concentrated on two points: first, their educational backgrounds differ, in that most members of the “professional group” have received a good secular education; second, the paths they advocate for realizing Islamic law differ, in that the “professional group” holds that one should first build a supportive ecosystem and then, in a gradual and inclusive manner, implement Islamic law in Malaysia.[14]

(3) The Growth of the “Professional Group”

In 2008, PAS, under the leadership of the “professional group,” adopted a relatively prudent campaign-publicity strategy. In its “home base” of Kelantan, PAS put forward the campaign slogan “Developing Together with Islam” (Membangun Bersama Islam).[15] At the federal level, however, PAS deliberately played down its religious coloring, advancing the proposition of a “welfare state” (Negara Berkeadilan) and making no mention whatsoever of an “Islamic state.”[16] The polarization between the campaign manifestos at the federal and state levels in fact reflected a contradictory cognition: in order to win the votes of a broader body of voters, PAS had to choose the moderate “middle road”; but only by holding fast to the core ideological position of “political Islam” could it guarantee the support of its traditional grassroots Malay voters.

Anwar Ibrahim, the spiritual leader of the People’s Justice Party, after his release from prison in 2004, actively promoted the union of anti-Barisan Nasional forces. Through his efforts, in the 2008 general election the three major opposition parties contested as a quasi-alliance^①, and achieved a historic breakthrough: the “Pakatan Rakyat” (People’s Alliance) formed by the three parties won a total of 86 seats in the House of Representatives and took control of the governments of five states, including Penang and Selangor. Among them, PAS won 23 seats.^②

After the general election, UMNO, dissatisfied with its results, began actively to court PAS for cooperation with the “Barisan Nasional” in order to form a “unity government.” Hadi Awang, too, revealed an intention to cooperate with UMNO, but this met with strong opposition from the party’s spiritual leader, Nik Aziz, and the internal contradictions within PAS were thereby brought into the open.[18] Nik Aziz further demanded that a special assembly (*muktamar khas*) be convened to purge “problem leaders,” with the spearhead pointed directly at Hadi Awang.[19] The intraparty strife provoked by the “UMNO–PAS dialogue” ultimately ended with the compromise of Hadi and others.

The weakness of the Ulama faction was soon exposed in the party election of June 2011. Mohamad Sabu was elected as PAS’s first deputy chairman of non-Ulama origin in nearly 25 years,[20] and rumors that Ulama rule had been shaken ran rife. Hadi Awang himself also stated that, since the party constitution did not explicitly stipulate that the party chairman must be held by a member of the Ulama, “if the timing is right, PAS may see a party chairman of non-Ulama origin.”[21]

(4) The Split of the Islamic Party

As the Ulama faction declined, PAS's position within the "Pakatan Rakyat" also became delicate. In order to cooperate with the other parties of the alliance — especially the Democratic Action Party — PAS had no choice but to work hard to play down its own religious coloring. In the "People's Manifesto" (Manifesto Rakyat) put forward by the "Pakatan Rakyat" on the eve of the 2013 general election, apart from mentioning "respecting Islam as the state religion,"^③ there was not a single proposition concerning Islam.

Concerning PAS's continual compromises, there had always been different opinions within the party. In 2009, Nasrudin Hassan Tantawi was elected the first head of the PAS Youth wing of Ulama origin in ten years. During this period, the PAS Youth wing began to suspect that their own party was gradually abandoning "the original aspiration of striving for Islam." It was also during this period that more and more friction occurred between PAS and the secular Democratic Action Party.[22]

In the Thirteenth General Election of May 2013, the "Pakatan Rakyat" achieved a further breakthrough in its electoral results, but the number of PAS's seats in the House of Representatives fell to 21 — a considerable gap compared with the 38 seats won by the Democratic Action Party and the 30 seats won by the People's Justice Party. At the same time, PAS lost the government of Kedah, which it had won in the previous general election, while its allies the Democratic Action Party and the Justice Party still held on to the governments of Penang and Selangor.^④ In Hadi Awang's view, this situation was extremely critical, because it meant that PAS had lost the support of its traditional grassroots Malay voters in this general election.[23]

During the same period, the "professional group's" support within the party also entered a crisis. Taking Nik Aziz's stepping down as Menteri Besar of Kelantan as the dividing line, the balance of forces within PAS underwent a thorough change. In 2013, Nik Aziz's health worsened day by day, and he had no choice but to step down as Menteri Besar of Kelantan. The Ulama faction seized this opportunity to revive the issue of Islamic criminal law once again. In April 2014, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Department, Jamil Khir Baharom, declared in the House of Representatives that the central government was prepared to assist PAS in implementing Islamic criminal law in Kelantan, which it governed, but on the precondition that an amendment to the relevant statutes be passed by a majority vote in parliament in order to expand the jurisdiction of the state Islamic courts.[24] The PAS Ulama faction swiftly seized the opportunity, attempting to expand the administrative jurisdiction of the Islamic courts in Kelantan.[25] As a Chinese-based party, the Democratic Action Party reacted especially strongly to this. The party's national organizing secretary, Anthony Loke, warned that "if PAS insists on implementing Islamic criminal law, in violation of the consensus reached by the 'Pakatan Rakyat,' then PAS should withdraw from the Pakatan." [26] However, the Democratic Action Party's stance did not halt the pace of PAS's advancement of Islamic criminal law.

In February 2015, the spiritual leader of PAS and chairman of the Ulama Consultative Council, Nik Aziz, passed away. Subsequently, on 19 March, PAS passed in the Kelantan State Assembly the "Kelantan Syariah Criminal Code (II) 1993 (Amendment) Bill 2015," [27] and Hadi Awang thereafter, in March of that year, sent a letter to the House of Representatives, tabling in his private capacity the "Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 (Amendment) Bill" (hereafter "Act 355"), advocating the implementation of Islamic criminal law nationwide.^① After the tabling of the bill met with resolute opposition from the Democratic Action Party, on 6 June the Ulama Consultative Council resolved to sever the relationship of cooperation with the Democratic Action Party. In response, the secretary-general of the Democratic Action Party, Lim Guan

Eng, declared his acceptance of the resolution to sever ties and announced the dissolution of the “Pakatan Rakyat.”[28]

After ties with the Democratic Action Party were severed, the contradictions between the Ulama faction and the “professional group” that supported the alliance could no longer be reconciled. As a result, the 2015 PAS party election became the critical juncture determining the party’s direction of development. However, in this contest the “professional group” was collectively defeated, and the Ulama faction won a comprehensive victory. The 18 “professional group” leaders, who had lost their footing within the party, subsequently resigned from the party collectively, and on 13 July launched the “New Hope Movement” (Gerakan Harapan Baru), seeking support for themselves through a roadshow.[29] On 20 July, the former director of the PAS election committee, Mohd Hatta, stated that the “New Hope Movement” would formally register as a political party on 14 September, and that they hoped to reorganize the opposition coalition.[30] On 22 July, the former spiritual leader of the “Pakatan Rakyat,” Anwar, formally expressed his support for the “New Hope Movement.”[31] However, both the “Barisan Nasional” and PAS did their utmost to prevent the “New Hope Movement” from growing. UMNO’s mouthpiece, *Utusan Melayu*, held that the “New Hope Movement’s” relationship with the Democratic Action Party was excessively close and was a betrayal of Islam.[32] PAS, for its part, expelled all party leaders and cadres connected with the “New Hope Movement.”[33] In the end, because the request to establish a new party could not obtain approval from the Registry of Societies, on 31 August the “New Hope Movement” finally announced that they would take over the Workers’ Party of Malaysia (Parti Pekerja-Pekerja Malaysia) and start afresh by establishing “AMANAH.”[34]

In sum, from the formation of the “professional group” to the founding of AMANAH took nearly 20 years, and its history can be divided into four periods: the years 1998 to 2004 were the period of the “professional group’s” formation; from 2004 to 2008, the “professional group” entered the PAS leadership; from 2008 to 2014, the “professional group” entered the leadership and challenged the leadership position of the Ulama faction; and from 2014 to 2015, the Ulama faction grew strong again, and the “professional group” was forced to leave PAS and found AMANAH.

In May 2018, AMANAH, as a member party of the “Pakatan Harapan” (Alliance of Hope), took part in a general election for the first time, winning 11 seats in the House of Representatives and capturing 34 State Legislative Assembly seats across the states of Selangor, Johor, and others. At the same time, in the cabinet assembled by the then prime minister Mahathir, AMANAH obtained 5 full ministerial posts, including Minister of Defence, Minister of Agriculture, and Minister of Health, as well as 5 deputy ministerial posts; in particular, party chairman Mohamad Sabu took up the key post of Minister of Defence.

II. The Split of PAS: The Transformation of the Voter Structure and the Dispute over Routes

From the formation of the “professional group” to the founding of AMANAH, PAS underwent nearly 20 years of internal struggle and split. Owing to the growth of the Malay middle class within Malaysia and the imbalance of regional development, PAS’s split was inevitable; the reconstruction of Malaysia’s party-political map and the changes in the currents of political-Islamic thought worldwide were important external thrusts; and sudden events both within PAS and at the international level further accelerated the eruption of contradictions.

(1) The Fundamental Divergence Between the Two Factions Within PAS: The Inter-Factional Dispute over the Political Line

At present, there are many different formulations within Malaysia of the factional struggle within PAS. The Democratic Action Party, borrowing from the political situation in Turkey, proposed that within PAS there existed a “professional faction” and an “Erdoğan faction,” and subsequently went a step further and labeled them the “enlightened faction” and the “conservative faction.”[35] This formulation received the support of the Democratic Action Party’s national secretary-general, Lim Guan Eng, and went on to be widely used in the Chinese-language media.[36]

However, this view was soon called into question. Both Khoo Wei Yang and Gan Ping Sieu pointed out that Lim Guan Eng stood entirely on the standpoint of the Democratic Action Party, and that to call the faction that leaned toward the Democratic Action Party the “enlightened faction” was in fact a simplistic dichotomy, behind which lay, for the most part, political calculations.[37] This view is very easily refuted; for example, AMANAH chairman Mohamad Sabu has all along been a staunch supporter of the Iranian Islamic Revolution.[38] Therefore, simply pinning the label of “enlightened faction” on AMANAH is inappropriate.

The contradictions within PAS are intricate and complex, but specific to the two factions of party members — those of AMANAH and those of PAS — the fundamental political divergence between the two lies in whether one should, in order to win more votes, continue to “submit” to the secularizing propositions of the Democratic Action Party and the “Pakatan Rakyat” (and the later “Pakatan Harapan”). This is extremely crucial for understanding PAS’s split.

(2) The Fundamental Cause of PAS’s Split: Social Transformation and the Change in the Voter Structure

Against the broader backdrop of globalization, the long-term development of the Malaysian economy enlarged the group of urban Malay middle class, providing the soil for the expansion of the “professional group”; but differences in regional development forced PAS to adopt different campaign strategies and governing programs, ultimately leading to factional formation and party split.

In 1997, a constitutional crisis broke out in Kelantan, PAS’s long-standing “fortress,” and the ruling PAS fell into severe disagreement with the state’s royal house over the issue of Islamic criminal law. PAS’s leaders believed that they would find it very difficult to gain more support in Kelantan, and so turned to seek other avenues to expand their own voter base.[39] In 1998, the Reformasi movement and the split within UMNO provided an excellent opportunity for PAS. The then PAS chairman Fadzil Noor and Anwar were both leaders of the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM); therefore, after the outbreak of the Reformasi movement, Fadzil Noor incorporated Anwar’s supporters into his own ranks. In the space of just one year, the membership of PAS grew from 400,000 to 800,000.[40] Previously, although PAS had been the principal opposition party on the Malaysian political stage, its influence had been confined only to the states of Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu. This “absorption” of members was in fact a top-down reform by Fadzil Noor of PAS’s membership structure.

After 2008, the PAS “professional group” and the Ulama faction established their respective voter bases in Selangor and Kelantan, respectively. However, the voter compositions of these two states were very different. Specifically, taking the 2015 data as an example, in Selangor the three major ethnic groups —

Malay, Chinese, and Indian — accounted for 52.65%, 24.97%, and 11.58% respectively, with other ethnic groups accounting for 0.7%, and a male-to-female ratio of 1.08 to 1, all close to the national average;^① per capita GDP was 44,616 ringgit, and the per capita literacy rate was 98.7%,^② so it can be regarded as a model of Malaysia’s modernization achievements. By contrast, in Kelantan, the most economically backward state, the Malay ethnic group accounted for 93% of the total population; agriculture remained Kelantan’s most important industry, accounting for 24.6% of Kelantan’s total GDP, the highest in the country.^③ Kelantan has therefore long maintained the character of a traditional Malay countryside and has not experienced social changes as drastic as those on the west coast.

[Figure 1: Urbanization rate of administrative units at the state level in Peninsular Malaysia (2010). — figure omitted; see original]

Source: *Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristic Report 2010*, Department of Statistics Malaysia, https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/cthem&menu_id=L0pheU43NWJwRWVSZklWdzQ4TlI (accessed 1 December 2019).

As can be seen from Figure 1, the states where PAS traditionally enjoyed higher support rates — Kelantan, Terengganu, and Kedah — are all areas with low urbanization rates; conversely, quite a few of the seats won by the “professional group” came from Selangor, which has an urbanization rate of nearly 90%.^① It can thus be seen that a structural rupture had formed between the voter bases of the “professional group” and the Ulama faction. On the one hand, PAS needed to attract the support of the highly urbanized Selangor voters; on the other hand, it had to maintain its traditional Malay rural votes. This “deformed” voter structure ultimately led to the split of the two factions of party members.

(3) The Fuse of PAS’s Split: The Death of Key Leading Figures

The cause of the structural rupture in PAS’s grassroots voter base was that the “professional group” did not emerge through natural evolution from within PAS, but was formed through “grafting” by means of top-down reform. This ruptured structure required the support of strong and powerful leaders, and the struggle within PAS’s leadership accelerated the intraparty split.

The Ulama faction of PAS was not itself a united whole, but was divided into a Kelantan faction (PAS Kelantan) and a Terengganu faction (PAS Terengganu), or a pragmatist faction and an idealist faction.[41] The “Kelantan faction” corresponds to the pragmatist leaders, represented by Nik Aziz, whose constituencies were in Kelantan; the “Terengganu faction” corresponds to the idealist leaders, represented by Hadi Awang, whose constituencies were in Terengganu.

After PAS suffered a crushing defeat in the 1986 general election, the party’s centrist, Fadzil Noor, led PAS onto a relatively pragmatic political line. After the outbreak of the Reformasi movement, PAS absorbed nearly 400,000 of Anwar’s supporters. Although Fadzil Noor successfully accomplished the engineering of a top-down change in the membership structure, maintaining two factions of starkly contrasting members within the same party required the leader to pursue a strong and powerful “middle road” in order to reconcile the contradictions between the two factions. In 2002, the sudden death of Fadzil Noor interrupted the process of PAS’s reform, yet his successor Hadi Awang neither continued the reform agenda nor successfully implemented his own idealist proposition — the implementation of Islamic criminal law in Terengganu. The defeat in the 2004 general election gave the “professional group” the opportunity to lead PAS. And behind

the “professional group’s” growth within PAS there was also the strong support of Nik Aziz. In 2008, Mohamad Sabu was once defeated in an election, but the sudden death of the “Barisan Nasional” member of parliament for the Kuala Terengganu constituency gave Mohamad Sabu an opportunity. In the by-election held at the end of the year, Nik Aziz publicly supported Mohamad’s running again, on the grounds that he “appreciated his talent for public speaking.”[42] Although PAS in the end fielded another candidate, Nik Aziz’s stance reflected his support for the “professional group” and his hope that PAS would remain in the “Pakatan Rakyat”; his own identity as a religious scholar was also able to harmonize the opinions of the Ulama faction. However, after Nik Aziz’s death in 2015, the two major camps, having lost their coordinator, quickly moved toward a thorough split.

(4) The External Factor in PAS’s Split: The Struggle Between the “Pakatan Rakyat” and UMNO

The allied parties within the “Pakatan Rakyat” and UMNO within the “Barisan Nasional” continually courted PAS in the course of their struggle, forming an external force that intensified the “dispute over routes” among the factions within PAS.

First, the “professional group” strongly favored inter-party alliance; the idealists within the Ulama faction, however, hoped to implement the entirety of Islamic law nationwide as quickly as possible. This was borne out, after the Fourteenth General Election, in a series of statements by Hadi Awang. The route designed by the Ulama faction represented by Hadi Awang was to make PAS the “kingmaker” — to prevent either of the two major coalitions from obtaining a simple majority of seats in the general election, and then to display PAS’s willingness to ally with any party, so that the two major coalitions, in order to seize federal power, would have no choice but to accept PAS’s proposition of implementing Islamic law.[43] If PAS remained within the opposition coalition, this strategy clearly could not be realized. UMNO’s ambiguous attitude toward “Act 355”^① further made the idealists within PAS recognize that this path was worth attempting.

Second, another reason the “professional group” lost support was its excessively close relationship of interest with the Democratic Action Party. There existed a vast contrast between the Democratic Action Party and PAS — Chinese versus Malays on the ethnic basis, and secularism versus theocracy on the religious basis. In the Thirteenth General Election, PAS was the party with the fewest seats within the opposition coalition, while the strength of the Democratic Action Party grew further. In 2015, PAS held its leadership election, and the secretary of the Democratic Action Party, Lim Guan Eng, publicly stated that he himself “opposed Hadi but not PAS.” This statement not only interfered in PAS’s internal affairs but also made clear the Democratic Action Party’s support for the “professional group.” PAS’s supreme program was to strive for Islam, whereas Lim Guan Eng could only hope for a split within PAS — hoping that the party election would produce an “enlightened faction,” and further hoping that the “enlightened faction” could stand together with them.[44] The Ulama faction’s leaders took this opportunity to stir up sentiment within the party, and with a sweeping force defeated the “professional group” and won the party election.

[Figure 2: The dispute over routes within PAS. — figure omitted; see original]

Source: Compiled by the authors.

(5) The Ideological Basis of PAS's Split: The "Demonstration Effect" of the "Arab Spring"

In addition to the realist political factors described above, Islamic currents of thought worldwide also exerted a certain influence on PAS's split. After the end of the Cold War, a current of "moderation thought" (moderation thought) took shape within the Islamic world. This "moderation thought" originated in the idea of "moderation" in the Qur'an. At the turn of the century, especially after the "9/11 incident," in order to resist the tide of globalization, counter the "clash of civilizations" thesis, resist terrorism, and consolidate Muslim solidarity, Islamic countries generally advocated moderation.[45] PAS's transformation also occurred during this period.

"Moderation" was an ideological proposition produced by the Islamic world to counter globalization, fundamentally in order to resist the influence that the "westernization" accompanying globalization might bring about. But with the outbreak of the "Arab Spring" in 2011, moderation gave way to the two great currents of "comprehensive democratization" and "comprehensive conservatization." Specific to Malaysia, the influence of the Arab Spring was chiefly manifested in two respects.

On the one hand, the "Muslim Democrats" of the Tunisian leader Rached Ghannouchi profoundly influenced PAS's "professional group" as well as the later AMANAH, and challenged the dominant position of political Islam in the ideological sphere. Tunisia's experiment in democratization provided Malaysia with a referenceable "model" — that "Sharia law," or Islamic law, can be unified with a democratic system. Samuel Huntington once used this "demonstration effect" to explain the wave of democratization in the late twentieth century; he held that the demonstration effect not only encouraged local social leaders "to emulate" but also showed "how these things are done." [46] Benedict Anderson likewise adopted a similar concept when explaining the rise of nationalism in Europe; he used the word "piracy" to refer to this demonstration effect.[47]

[Figure 3: Diagram of the relationship between PAS's split and AMANAH's founding. — figure omitted; see original]

Note: In the figure, the "period of Fadzil Noor's leadership" refers to the period during which Fadzil Noor served as PAS chairman (1989–2002), while the "period of Nik Aziz as spiritual leader" refers to the period from Fadzil Noor's death until Nik Aziz's death (2002–2015). Source: Compiled by the authors.

When speaking of the difference between AMANAH and PAS, AMANAH members generally stated that they are not, like the PAS led by the Ulama faction, fixated on the formal aspects of Islamic law; what they pursue is the spirit embodied in Islamic law (the core principles of *Maqasid al-Shari'ah*). Mohamad Sabu, for his part, stated that what AMANAH seeks to pursue is a kind of "leadership of the God-fearing" (*Kepimpinan Muttaqin*).^①[48] In the process of constructing a party ideology, AMANAH has already, to a considerable degree, expanded PAS's original interpretation of the practice of Islamic law. Dzulkefly Ahmad, the Minister of Health during the Pakatan Harapan government, holds that AMANAH represents "political Islam 2.0" — that is, on the premise of keeping the spiritual core of Islam unchanged, it has achieved an ideological renewal.[49]

On the other hand, the "Arab Spring" also caused the traditional religious forces to unite more closely together. In the 2013 general election, the "Barisan Nasional" lost to the opposition coalition in terms of vote share, and its rule, having lost the support of a majority of voters, was in grave peril. Although the inducements

were not identical, Malaysia, like other countries of the Islamic world, faced the challenge of the wave of democratization. The then prime minister Najib repeatedly stated on public occasions that there would be no “Malaysian Spring.”[50] He further proposed, in his campaign manifesto, to exempt from taxation young people under the age of 26.[51] Najib’s statement had already revealed his anxiety over losing the support of young voters. Faced with this situation, the UMNO he led actively courted the PAS Ulama faction, attempting to consolidate the support of rural voters. Although the “Arab Spring” did not produce a direct influence, it nevertheless formed, in the Malaysian political arena, a pair of forces acting in opposite directions, acting respectively on the two factions of PAS. In the end, the “Jasmine Revolution” became the catalyst for PAS’s split.

In sum, the expansion of the Malay middle class and the imbalance of regional development determined PAS’s ruptured voter structure, and the fragility of the top-down reform advocated by Fadzil Noor was the principal cause of the appearance of this structural rupture. The deaths of Fadzil Noor and Nik Aziz made the contradictions between the two factions irreconcilable, while the contradictions among the various member parties of the “Pakatan Rakyat” and the changes in Islamic currents of thought worldwide also played a certain promoting role.

III. AMANAH: Current Situation and Prospects

(1) Selangor — AMANAH’s “Base Area”

Although it is only a newly established party, AMANAH had already won 11 seats in the House of Representatives in the Fourteenth General Election of 9 May 2018. It is not difficult to discover that most of these seats “inherited” the multi-ethnic “mixed constituencies” originally held by PAS in Selangor. Surveying the results of the four general elections from 1999 to 2013, the PAS “professional group” performed most outstandingly in Selangor; in 2013 it even successfully formed a coalition government with the People’s Justice Party in Selangor.

Table 1. Seats in the House of Representatives won by AMANAH in the Fourteenth General Election

State	Constituency	2008 General Election: Winning Party	2013 General Election: Winning Party	2018 General Election: Winning Party	Share of Malays (and Other Bumiputera)
Kedah	P008: POKOK SENA (Pokok Sena)	PAS	PAS	AMANAH	82%
Perak	P057: PARIT BUNTAR (Parit Buntar)	PAS	PAS	AMANAH	69%
Perak	P74: LUMUT (Lumut)	Barisan Nasional	Justice Party	AMANAH	51%

State	Constituency	2008 General Election: Winning Party	2013 General Election: Winning Party	2018 General Election: Winning Party	Share of Malays (and Other Bumiputera)
Pahang	P88: TEMERLOH (Temerloh)	Barisan Nasional	PAS	AMANAH	67%
Selangor	P096: KUALA SELANGOR (Kuala Selangor)	PAS	Barisan Nasional	AMANAH	66%
Selangor	P101: HULU LANGAT (Hulu Langat)	PAS	PAS	AMANAH	67%
Selangor	P108: SHAH ALAM (Shah Alam)	PAS	PAS	AMANAH	76%
Selangor	P111: KOTA RAJA (Kota Raja)	PAS	PAS	AMANAH	48%
Selangor	P113: SEPANG (Sepang)	Barisan Nasional	PAS	AMANAH	59%
Negeri Sembilan	P133: TAMPIN (Tampin)	Barisan Nasional	Barisan Nasional	AMANAH	61%
Johor	P161: PULAI (Pulai)	Barisan Nasional	Barisan Nasional	AMANAH	48%

Source: This table was compiled by the authors. The relevant data are from “14th General Election Malaysia (GE14/PRU14),” *The Star*, <https://election.thestar.com.my/ft.html> (accessed 1 December 2019). The population data are as of 2013.

From Table 1, one can see the seats won by the PAS “professional group” in the mixed and suburban constituencies along the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. As a traditional east-coast Malay ethnic party, why were the PAS “professional group” and, later, AMANAH able to extend their strength into Selangor?

In the 1990s, the Malaysian economy entered a period of takeoff. The government, through privatizing state-owned assets and pursuing liberal fiscal policies while at the same time attracting large amounts of foreign capital, strove to create a generation of “new Malays.” These emerging urban Malay middle class were a “consumer class” produced amid polarization;[52] more importantly, a Malay middle class detached from traditional rural life was continually growing. This emerging Malay middle class already differed greatly

from their forebears in income, occupation, and educational level, and they flooded into the big cities to seek opportunities for work.[53]

Table 2. Changes in PAS’s Seats in Peninsular Malaysia, 1999–2013

State	Malay and Other Bumi-putera Population (2015)	Share of Malays and Other Bumi-putera (2015)	1999: DR	1999: SA	2004: DR	2004: SA	2008: DR	2008: SA	2013: DR	2013: SA
Perlis	249,000	85.7%	0	3	0	1	0	2	0	1
Kedah	2,097,000	75.7%	8	12	1	5	6	16	1	9
Kelantan	1,761,000	93.1%	10	41	6	24	8	37	9	40
Terengganu	1,161,000	94.4%	7	28	0	4	2	8	4	14
Penang	1,698,000	41.3%	0	1	0	1	0	1	2	1
Perak	2,499,000	55.8%	0	3	0	0	2	6	1	3
Pahang	1,608,000	74.9%	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
Selangor	6,178,000	52.7%	0	4	0	0	4	8	4	15
Kuala Lumpur	1,780,000	40.3%	0	–	0	–	1	–	0	–
Negeri Sembilan	1,089,000	57.6%	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Malacca (Melaka)	889,000	64.4%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Johor	3,610,000	53.9%	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	4

Note: “DR” denotes the number of seats in the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat); “SA” denotes the number of seats in the State Legislative Assembly. Constituency redelineations were carried out before the 1999 general election and before the 2004 general election. Kuala Lumpur is a Federal Territory and has no State Legislative Assembly. The data for the Putrajaya constituency are not listed in this table. Source: The election-results data are compiled from Chen Zhonghe (Malaysia), *Islamic Party Politics in Malaysia: A Comparison of UMNO and the Islamic Party*; and *Peta Kawasan Pilihan Raya*, Utusan Online. The population data are compiled from *Kajian Semula Persempadanan*, Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya, Jilid 1 (2018).

Fundamentally, Selangor’s urbanization rate ranks first among the states of the Malay Peninsula, and it is the most economically developed. On the one hand, the prosperous economy nurtures a vast middle-class population; on the other hand, this urbanization is a kind of “false urbanization” and “excessive urbanization,” in which large numbers of Malays who come from the countryside to the cities find it difficult to obtain sufficient employment opportunities.[54] The outbreak of the two financial crises of 1997 and 2008 laid this malady thoroughly bare. The cronyism, nepotism, and serious corruption problems under UMNO’s long

rule were most capable of stirring up the voices of opposition among the urban populace in Selangor. This is also an important reason why they turned to support another professional group capable of representing them.

In the five general elections from 1999 to 2018, the PAS “professional group” and, later, AMANAH performed outstandingly in Selangor, achieving their best electoral results; however, because the “Pakatan Harapan” adopted a strategy of unified constituency allocation in this general election, the expansion of AMANAH’s strength was to some extent affected.[55]

(2) AMANAH’s Predicament

At present, AMANAH still faces numerous challenges. First, as a party with Islam at its core, AMANAH’s attitude toward religion is nonetheless often ambiguous and unclear, which is highly unfavorable to its long-term party-building and development. Articles 1 and 2 of Chapter 3 of AMANAH’s party constitution point out, respectively, that “AMANAH takes Islam as the cornerstone of its struggle” and that it will “take Islam as a blessing for all the people and build a civilized nation and society.”^① However, in order to expand its mass base, AMANAH, when recruiting members, has proposed “without regard to ethnicity or religion.”^② At the same time, in choosing the party’s name, AMANAH deliberately played down its religious ideology and chose the universal moral standard of trustworthiness (AMANAH) as the party’s emblem.^③ All of this shows that AMANAH is still seeking a balance between religious ideals and actual political interests.

In addition, AMANAH’s attitude toward Islamic criminal law remains unclear. “Act 355” was the fuse for the disintegration of the “Pakatan Rakyat,” yet AMANAH has not ruled out the possibility of implementing “Act 355.” This ambiguous attitude is undoubtedly a hidden danger within AMANAH.

Second, AMANAH cannot completely shake off the influence of PAS. AMANAH has consistently taken PAS’s withdrawal from the Pakatan in 2015 as the starting point of the party’s founding. At the same time, they also revere Nik Aziz as their own spiritual mentor, emphasizing that AMANAH was established under Nik Aziz’s guidance.^④[56] The reason these two points are emphasized is that AMANAH regards itself as the orthodox heir to PAS’s spirit of struggle, and regards this “inheritance” as the political legitimacy of its own existence.

Third, AMANAH has not yet formed a unified political program internally. When interviewing AMANAH members, Maszlee Malik found that, owing to the lack of a program, there were differing interpretations within AMANAH of the party’s own ideology. In the first few years of its founding, the AMANAH party machine operated mainly for the general election. But now, as one of the member parties of Malaysia’s ruling coalition, AMANAH must establish its own political program as quickly as possible and form a differentiated positioning. Maurice Duverger held that, if a country has more than one conflict occurring simultaneously, and the people involved in these conflicts overlap, the number of political parties will increase, with each party corresponding to a different political stance.[57] But one of the premises on which this theory holds is that the electoral system does not suppress small parties. Malaysia’s small-constituency (single-member-district) system is in essence conducive to the formation of a two-party system, and unfavorable to the survival of a small party like AMANAH. In the Fourteenth General Election, 5 of the 11 seats AMANAH obtained were in Selangor, which, compared with its period as PAS’s “professional group,” did not represent much of a breakthrough; its strength is relatively weak, and it faces the possibility of being

assimilated.

Likewise, finding its own correct positioning is also conducive to AMANAH's expanding its influence within the coalition. The reason the "Barisan Nasional" weakened was, in part, precisely that its member parties gradually drew closer to UMNO, so that the party coalition gradually lost its original multi-ethnic basis. If AMANAH veers excessively toward secularization, it will grow ever closer to the People's Justice Party; if it overemphasizes its religious coloring, it will lean back toward PAS. It may be said that AMANAH has inherited the "middle-road predicament" that PAS once faced.

Conclusion

With the development of Malaysia's economy and society, over a span of some 20 years, a brand-new Malay middle class gradually took shape, and the gulf between it and traditional Malay rural society continually widened. In this sense, PAS's split was inevitable. Certain contingent factors at the leadership level caused the departure of the "professional group" and brought about the founding of AMANAH. After the split, PAS displayed a still more pronounced religious coloring, while AMANAH is still searching for its own positioning.

Did PAS lose the election? In fact, the post-split PAS and AMANAH appear to have grown stronger. At the federal level, PAS and AMANAH together won 29 seats in the House of Representatives, already surpassing PAS's best result in history; AMANAH chairman Mohamad Sabu was also successfully appointed Minister of Defence of the Pakatan Harapan government. At the State Legislative Assembly level, PAS was clearly the real winner; almost single-handedly, it wrested the governments of Kelantan and Terengganu from the two major party blocs, the "Barisan Nasional" and the "Pakatan Harapan," and brought about a nearly two-month-long "Hung Parliament" in Kedah.^① One year after the "509" general election, PAS and UMNO formally formed the political alliance "Muafakat Nasional" (National Consensus Alliance), continually challenging the new "Pakatan Harapan" government in by-elections.

In 2020, as the Malay ethnic group fragmented, party fragmentation intensified, and discord repeatedly arose among the political elites, the Malaysian political situation became, for a time, turbulent and surging: first there was the rumor at the Pakatan Harapan Supreme Council meeting of "forcing the palace" to make Mahathir cede power, and then there was the "Sheraton Move," in which factions of the ruling and opposition parties conspired in a "coup." On 24 February, Mahathir abruptly resigned from the office of prime minister, and the chairman of the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (BERSATU), Muhyiddin, announced his withdrawal from the "Pakatan Harapan"; thus the Pakatan Harapan government, after holding federal power for one year and nine months, collapsed utterly. After nearly a week of political struggle, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Sultan Abdullah, after due deliberation, judged that Muhyiddin and the "Perikatan Nasional"^② that he led enjoyed the support of a majority of the members of parliament, and appointed him the eighth prime minister of Malaysia.

The disintegration of the "Pakatan Harapan" was not merely a "political reshuffle" provoked by the personal grievances between Mahathir and Anwar; behind it lay structural causes within Malaysia's party politics. First, with the increase in the number of political parties that took shape as power changed hands after the Fourteenth General Election — parties of comparable strength — the party system of UMNO's one-party dominance during the Barisan Nasional era was broken, and the various parties and factions needed to recon-

struct stable coalitions in order to win general elections and form governments. However, the long-standing ethnic politics obstructed cooperation among the parties within the new coalition, while the old patronage politics, nepotism, and intraparty factional struggles spread throughout the entire coalition, provoking the split of parties and the disintegration of the coalition. In the end, the various parties and factions, after splitting apart and disintegrating, sought to recombine and once again take hold of power in a manner consistent with the constitution.

At present, the two foremost tasks facing the Muhyiddin cabinet are, first, to respond to the rapid spread of the novel coronavirus epidemic within the country, and second, against the backdrop of an international financial crisis and a global economic downturn triggered by the spread of the virus and the sharp fall in oil prices, to revive the sluggish Malaysian economy. At the same time, the government and party coalition that he leads also face problems such as internal party struggles, parliamentary votes of no confidence, and contests over local power. As a Malay nationalist leader, although Muhyiddin successfully assembled a coalition government uniting the majority of Malays, the competition for power within the coalition still outweighs the interests brought by cooperation; the split of Malay ethnic parties continues, and religious views and ideologies continually diverge. All of this will reshape the configuration of Islamic party politics in Malaysia, and is bound to influence the future political trajectory of Malaysia.

(We thank the anonymous reviewers of *Southeast Asian Affairs* for their valuable comments and suggestions for revision; any omissions in the text are the responsibility of the authors.)

Notes

① The Hizbul Muslimin Party of Malaysia was a party founded in 1983 by former PAS chairman Mohamad Asri. In 1982, Mohamad Asri was defeated in the PAS party election and lost the post of party chairman. The following year, PAS was defeated in the general election and was unable, as it had wished, to recapture the government of Kelantan. Deeply disappointed with PAS, Mohamad Asri chose to found a new party — HAMIM — to replace PAS. However, HAMIM performed poorly in the 1986 general election, and its influence declined steadily thereafter. See Ibrahim Abu Bakar, “PAS and Its Islamist Fundamentalism in Malaysia,” *Journal of Human Science*, Issue 43 (2009), pp. 10–19; Farish A. Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014, pp. 111–154.

② See Xu Liping et al., *Contemporary Southeast Asian Islam: Development and Challenges*, Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2008.

③ See Fan Ruolan et al., *Islam and the Modernization Process of Southeast Asia*, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2009.

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⑤ See Chen Zhonghe (Malaysia), *Islamic Party Politics in Malaysia: A Comparison of UMNO and the Islamic Party*, Kajang: Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies, New Era College, 2006.

⑥ See Farish A. Noor, *The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS (1951–2003)*, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2004; Farish A. Noor, *The Malaysian Islamic Party 1951–2013: Islamism in a Mottled Nation*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014.

⑦ See Dominik M. Müller, *Islam, Politics and Youth in Malaysia: The Pop-Islamist Reinvention of PAS*, Taylor & Francis Books, 2014.

⑧ See Wan Saiful Wan Jan, “Parti Amanah Negara in Johor: Birth, Challenges and Prospects,” *Trends in Southeast Asia*, ISEAS, No. 9 (2017).

⑨ Maszlee Malik was also the Minister of Education during the period of Malaysia’s Pakatan Harapan government. For his relevant research, see Maszlee Malik, “Rethinking the Role of Islam in Malaysian Politics: A Case Study of Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH),” *Islam and Civilisational Renewal (ICR)*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2017), pp. 457–472; Maszlee Malik, “From Political Islam to Democrat Muslim: A Case Study of Rashid Ghannouchi’s Influence on ABIM, IKRAM, AMANAH and DAP,” *Intellectual Discourse*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2017), pp. 21–53.

⑩ *Shura* (*shura*), meaning “consultation,” is from Chapter 42 of the Qur’an. The Chinese translation is from: Ma Jian (trans.), *The Qur’an*, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003, p. 361.

① Rached Ghannouchi holds that the members of the Ennahda Movement that he leads belong to the Muslim Democrats. While emphasizing the necessity of the separation of religion and state, he also foregrounds his own identity as a Muslim. See Maszlee Malik, “From Political Islam to Democrat Muslim: A Case Study of Rashid Ghannouchi’s Influence on ABIM, IKRAM, AMANAH and DAP,” p. 28. In his paper Maszlee Malik uses “Democrat Muslim” rather than “Muslim Democrats,” but according to Ghannouchi’s own relevant statements, the correct usage should be the latter. See Hussein Ibish, “‘Islamism Is Dead!’, Long Live Muslim Democrats,” *New York Times*, June 2, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opinion/tunisiast-new-revolution.html> (accessed 1 December 2019).

② The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party was written in Malay in the 1970s as “Partai Islam Sa-Malaysia,” and is now written in Malay as “Parti Islam Se Malaysia,” translated into Chinese as “Malaysian Islamic Party.”

① The Ulama Consultative Council is PAS’s highest advisory body and is not part of the executive apparatus. This advisory body is responsible for examining whether all party resolutions conform to the doctrines of Islam, and its members may be held only by the Ulama. Although the Ulama Consultative Council does not hold executive power, it has in fact held the supreme power of PAS.

② PAS’s spiritual leader and chief adviser; the successive holders of the position have been Yusuf Rawa (1987–1995), Nik Aziz (1995–2015), Haron Din (2015–2016), and Hashim Jasin (2016–present).

③ The “Reformasi” movement was a social movement launched by the supporters of former Malaysian deputy prime minister Anwar shortly after he was dismissed in 1998. This social movement involved a series of mass demonstrations and rallies, through which participants vented their dissatisfaction with the Barisan Nasional government. It was not until after Anwar was arrested that the “Reformasi” movement subsided.

④ The Justice Party (keADILan), namely the “National Justice Party” (Parti KeADILan Nasional), was the predecessor of the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat). In 2003, the National Justice Party merged

with the Parti Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Party) to form the People’s Justice Party, abbreviated as the “Justice Party.”

⑤ Currently the member of the House of Representatives for the Tun Razak Town constituency in Kuala Lumpur; a member of the People’s Justice Party.

⑥ During the period of the “Pakatan Harapan” government (May 2018 to March 2020), served as Malaysia’s Minister of Health; currently the member of the House of Representatives for the Kuala Selangor constituency, and director of AMANAH’s strategy bureau.

⑦ During the period of the “Pakatan Harapan” government, served as Malaysia’s Minister of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry; currently the deputy chairman of AMANAH.

① The parties — PAS, the Democratic Action Party, and the Justice Party — each pledged not to put up candidates in constituencies where the others were contesting, in order to avoid “three-cornered fights.”

② For the general-election results, see: Table of party situation in the 2008 general election, Sin Chew Net, <http://www.sinchew-i.com/special/election2008/result.phtml> (accessed 4 June 2018).

③ Rakyat Bersaudara, *Ringkasan Manifesto Rakyat*, Pakatan Harapan Rakyat.

④ For the results of the 2013 general election, see: Sin Chew Net, <http://www.sinchew.com.my/election2013/result/> (accessed 1 December 2019).

① This bill advocated raising the upper limit of the Islamic courts’ existing penalties of 3 years’ imprisonment, a fine of 5,000 ringgit, and 6 strokes of the cane, laying the foundation for the implementation of Islamic criminal law. For the relevant content, see Chen Zhonghe (Malaysia), “A Study of Contemporary State–Religion Relations in Malaysia: From the Perspective of the Changing Legal Status of Islam,” *Southeast Asian Affairs*, No. 1, 2018, p. 60.

① For the relevant data, see: *Kajian Semula Persempadanan*, Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya, Jilid 1 (2018), pp. 156–159, <http://www.spr.gov.my/sites/default/files/Jilid%201%20Kajian%20Semula%20Persempadanan%20V2.pdf> (accessed 1 December 2019).

② For the relevant data, see: *Laporan Ciri-Ciri Pendidikan dan Sosial Penduduk 2010*, Department of Statistics Malaysia, p. 4, https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/images/stories/files/LatestReleases/population/Summary_Findings_on_Edu (accessed 1 December 2019); *Selangor at a Glance*, Department of Statistics Malaysia, <https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.ph> (accessed 1 December 2019).

③ For the relevant data, see: *GDP by State, 2010–2016*, Department of Statistics Malaysia, <https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/inde> (accessed 1 December 2019); *Kajian Semula Persempadanan*, Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya, Jilid 1 (2018), p. 90.

① The 11 seats in the House of Representatives obtained by AMANAH included 5 Selangor seats, and of its 34 State Legislative Assembly seats, 8 belonged to Selangor. [Translator’s note: in the scrambled source this footnote reads that “5 seats and 8 seats respectively belong to Selangor seats” out of “the 11 seats in the House of Representatives and the 34 State Legislative Assembly seats”; reconstructed here accordingly.]

① For the latest developments on “Act 355,” see: Fu Congcong, “‘Act 355’ and the Structural Rupture of the Malaysian Political Arena,” *World Affairs*, No. 10, 2017, pp. 28–29.

① The word “the God-fearing” (*muttaqin*) first appears in “Chapter 2: The Cow (Al-Baqarah),” verse 2: “This is the Book; in it is guidance sure, without doubt, to those who fear God [the God-fearing].” The translation is from Ma Jian (trans.), *The Qur’an*, p. 1.

① Articles 1 and 2 of Chapter 3 — see Fasal 3, *Perlembagaan Parti Amanah Negara*, Parti Amanah Negara, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5xme7Nva1USUnFNeHBVMmFzbUE/view> (accessed 1 December 2019). The Malay originals are, respectively, “Memartabat dan menegakkan Islam sebagai dasar perjuangan” and “Mendirikan sebuah negara dan masyarakat madani dengan Islam sebagai rahmat untuk semua (Rahmatan Li Al-’Aalameen).”

② See Fasal 4, *Perlembagaan Parti Amanah Negara*, Parti Amanah Negara. The Malay original is “Keahlian Parti adalah terbuka kepada semua rakyat Malaysia tanpa mengira bangsa, kepercayaan atau jantina.”

③ See Fasal 2, *Perlembagaan Parti Amanah Negara*, Parti Amanah Negara.

④ For AMANAH’s account of the party’s founding history, see Sejarah Penubuhan AMANAH, Parti Amanah Negara, <https://amanah.org.my/sejarah/> (accessed 1 December 2019).

① In the Fourteenth General Election, the Pakatan Harapan won 18 seats in the Kedah State Legislative Assembly, PAS won 15 seats, and the Barisan Nasional won 3 seats. In the election results, Kedah saw a “Hung Parliament” in which the ruling and opposition parties were evenly matched, and the Pakatan Harapan was unable to form a government. In the end, over the nearly 2 months after the election closed, the Pakatan Harapan seized the government of Kedah by winning over Barisan Nasional members of parliament. See “Three UMNO Assemblymen Back Pakatan Harapan, 18+3 Elect the Speaker, Kedah Resolves the Hung Parliament Crisis,” Sin Chew Net, 4 July 2019, https://www.sinchew.com.my/content/content_1771034.html (accessed 1 December 2019).

② The “Perikatan Nasional” (National Alliance) was a new party coalition formed by BERSATU chairman Muhyiddin together with the UMNO-led “Barisan Nasional,” PAS, and the former Azmin faction of the Justice Party. This coalition cooperated with the Sarawak party coalition (Gabungan Parti Sarawak, GPS) to form a new Malaysian government.

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[2] Info Parti Amanah Negara, Parti Amanah Negara, <https://amanah.org.my/tentang-amanah/> (accessed 1 December 2019).

[3][4][6][10] Chen Zhonghe (Malaysia), *Islamic Party Politics in Malaysia: A Comparison of UMNO and the Islamic Party*, Kajang: Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies, New Era College, 2006, pp. 17, 106–107, 204–205, 222.

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Social Transformation, Dispute over Routes and the Split of Malaysian Islamic Party

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Abstract: In the 14th General Election (GE14) of Malaysia, the National Integrity Party (AMANAH) won 11 seats in the federal parliament and grew into an influential party with Islam as its foundation. The expansion of the new middle class of the Malay ethnic group and the imbalance of regional development contributed to the division of Ulama faction and the professional group, within the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), which triggered the battle of “how to realize the Islamic state”, and finally led to the division of PAS and the establishment of AMANAH. As a new political party, AMANAH must differentiate itself from other Malay-dominated political parties, establish a unified ideological basis, and survive for a long time.

Key words: Malaysia, Islamic Party, National Integrity Party, social transformation, factional politics